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COMMENTS

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CANINE
SNIFF SEARCH: FROM KATZ TO DOGS
I.

INTRODUCTION

It was Justice Frankfurter who observed that "[t]he
course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures...
has not... run smooth,"' and indeed it has not. One particular source of confusion in fourth amendment2 analysis is
the endless innovation in police surveillance techniques.
The technological revolution of recent decades has spawned
more than computer gadgetry and military wonders; it has
agencies with ever more efalso equipped law enforcement
3
fective investigative tools.

The fourth amendment has as its purpose the protection
of the inviolability of the individual from unreasonable governmental intrusion. The amendment is thus a "profoundly
anti-government document, ' 4 as it limits the right of the
state to intervene in one's life. Fourth amendment analysis
is complicated, then, because precisely that which the
amendment purports to oversee - governmental investigation - is constantly being modernized in ways the founders
could never have imagined.
1. Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
2. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
3. See generallyJ. CARR, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE §§ 1.01-1.03
(1977); S. DASH, THE EAVESDROPPERS (1959); C. FISHMAN, WIRETAPPING AND
EAVESDROPPING (1978 & Supp. 1983); M. PAULSEN, THE PROBLEMS OF ELECTRONIC
EAVESDROPPING (1977). See also Note, Police Use of Sense-EnhancingDevices and

the Limits of the Fourth Amendment, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 1167 (1977).
4. Amsterdam, Perspectiveson the FourthAmendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 353

(1974).
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This Comment considers one such investigative tool
which has come into common usage only in the past decade:
the drug-detecting dog. 5 It will be seen that, with rare exception, this nation's courts have been quite receptive to the use
of these dogs in crime detection. 6 Although their analyses
may differ, these courts reach essentially the same conclusion: the "sniff search" is not violative of the fourth amendment. This Comment will trace the development of the law
of canine sniff searches.7 It will then critique the various
analyses the courts offer in establishing the legitimacy of the
procedure.8 Finally, it will propose an alternative approach
which better accounts for established fourth amendment
thinking. 9
II.

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE
NONTRESPASSORY INTRUSION
A.

A Considerationof Katz

The use of canines in detecting contraband poses a
unique problem0 to fourth amendment analysis. A canine
"sniff search"' involves a nontrespassory, nonintrusive
search and seizure of intangible matter. As such, the sniff
search closely resembles the magnetometer," wiretap,' 2 and
5. Although canines are traindd to detect contraband other than drugs, the vast
majority of cases involve the detection of illegal drugs. But see State v. Quatsling, 24
Ariz. App. 105, 536 P.2d 226 (1975) (dogs used to detect contraband explosives), cert.
denied,424 U.S. 945 (1976).
6. See infra part III.
7. Id.
8. See infra part IV.
9. See infra part V.
10. "Sniff search" is probably the most illustrative and appropriate term to label
this investigative procedure. Typically, the dog, trained to respond to certain scents,
is presented with a subject to smell. If, upon smelling the airspace surrounding the
target, the dog detects the scent of the particular contraband, it communicates a positive reaction to its master. See Comment, United States v. Solis: Have the Government's Supersnifers Come Down With a Case of ConstitutionalNasal Congestion, 13
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 410, 414-18 (1976) (discussing training method for drug detection
dogs).
11. A magnetometer is an instrument which detects the presence of metal by responding to shifting magnetic fields. Courts have consistently held that the use of the
magnetometer constitutes a search. See, e.g., United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799
(2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 666 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,409 U.S. 991
(1972).
12. Wiretapping and bugging capabilities are truly remarkable with today's tech-
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electronic tracking device,1 3 all devices which effectively
"search" without a physical trespass. Because of its lack of
apparent intrusiveness, the nontrespassory search conflicts

with many persons' common-sense notion of what constitutes a search.14 Thus, constitutional analysis is rendered
more difficult.

An inquiry into the constitutionality of canine sniff
searches should properly begin, then, with an examination of
the development of the law regarding such nontrespassory
searches. Considering that such intrusions were only made
possible with modem advances in technology, this development has been of a recent and rapid nature. The initial formulation of the law arose in Olmstead v. United States,'5 a
1928 case. The United States Supreme Court there considered the constitutionality of the warrantless use of telephonic
eavesdropping devices, 16 which were employed to secure incriminating evidence against defendants. 17 In strictly inter-

preting the prohibitions of the fourth amendment, the Court
declared that "[t]he Amendment does not forbid what was
done here. There was no searching. There was no seizure
... . There was no entry of the houses or offices of the
nology. Unfortunately, it is far beyond the scope of this Comment to consider the
array of eavesdropping equipment now available. For a fine study of such equipment, see J. CARR, supra note 3, §§ 1.01-1.03.
13. The electronic tracking device, or "beeper," is a device which emits periodic
signals which can be picked up on a radio frequency, thus monitoring the approximate location of the object to which it is attached. Beepers are frequently attached to
vehicles, enabling authorities to track suspects without maintaining visual contact.
See Marks & Batey, Electronic Tracking Devices: Fourth Amendment Problems and
Solutions, 67 Ky. L.J. 987 (1979).
14. It also may conflict with the historical view of what constitutes a search. See
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 463 (1928) (observing that the well-known
historical purpose of amendment was to prevent governmental force to search one's
house, person, papers, or effects). It was later determined that the "trespass" doctrine
enunciated in 0insteadcould no longer be regarded as controlling. Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). See also Amsterdam, supra note 4, at 381-82.
15. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
16. "Small wires were inserted along the ordinary telephone wires. . . . The insertions were made without trespass upon any property of the defendants." Id at
456-57.
17. Olmstead headed a covert operation which imported and distributed contraband alcohol in violation of the Prohibition Act. Olmstead's involvement was revealed by the conversations intercepted by the wiretaps. Id at 457.
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defendants."'" Thus, the Olmsteaddecision established that
in order to find a search under the fourth amendment, there
must occur both a trespassory intrusion 9 and the seizure of
tangible matter. °
For the most part, the rule from Olmstead was maintained steadfastly through three decades.2 ' It was only with
22
the startling advances in electronic surveillance technology
that the Olmsteadtrespass doctrine was found to be inadequate. Such technology, and the promise of further sophistication in the future, 23 mandated that its property-based
analysis be discarded.
And so, in 1967, the trespass doctrine was discarded in
Katz v. United States,24 considered to be the most significant
fourth amendment case of our century. The Katz decision
overruled Olmstead and replaced its "talismanic" 26 trespass
doctrine with a subjective test which looked to the searchee's
expectation of privacy. As was his forbear, Katz was convicted of a federal offense, largely upon evidence secured by
an eavesdropping device. In declaring that the use of such
surveillance equipment constituted a search, the Court
commented:
[The Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.
What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his
own home or office, is not subject of Fourth Amendment
18. Id. at 464.
19. Id. See also Note, ConstitutionalLimitations on the Use of Canines to Detect
Evidence of Crime, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 973, 974 (1975-76).
20. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466. See also Note, supra note 19, at 974.
21. The rule was partially weakened by Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505
(1961). There, the Court found a fourth amendment violation where there was a
physical trespass - the insertion of a spike-mike into defendant's home - but no
seizure of tangible matter. Id at 509-12.
22. See J. CARR, supra note 3, §§ 1.01-1.03.
23. Justice Brandeis' 1928 Olmstead dissent recognized this threat of future sophistication. See Olmsteaa 277 U.S. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
24. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
25. See Amsterdam, supra note 4, at 382 (commenting that Katz "marks a watershed in fourth amendment jurisprudence").
26. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 n.9.
27. Katz was convicted of transmitting betting information across state lines in
violation of federal law. FBI agents secured incriminating evidence of Katz' involvement in this activity by attaching an electronic listening and recording device to the
public telephone booth from which Katz habitually disseminated the betting information. Id at 348.
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protection. .

.

. But what he seeks to preserve as private,

even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.28
This formulation of the scope of the fourth amendment
promised greater protection from governmental intrusion.2 9
Rather than measure the reach of the amendment by the
mere "presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any
given enclosure," 30 the Court made possible an inquiry into
whether an alleged intrusion "violated the privacy upon
which [the searchee] justifiably relied." 31 Such an inquiry
redirects the focus of fourth amendment protection from
mere property rights to fundamental privacy interests.32
It is commonly recited that the Katz decision established
the inviolability of that which one regards with a "reasonable expectation of privacy" 33 - a standard derived from
Justice Harlan's concurrence. Frequently, lower courts refer
only to Justice Harlan's opinion in establishing the parameters of fourth amendment protection, explicitly or implicitly
adopting his two-pronged test, which requires "first that a
person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society
is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'-34
Regarding this second factor, reasonableness, the Government in Katz argued in the alternative that even if a
search of the petitioner had occurred, the search was reason28. Id at 351-52.
29. See Amsterdam, supra note 4, at 382. But see United States v. Wright, 449
F.2d 1355, 1363-64 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (relying upon fact that the Katz decision overruled trespass requirement for conclusion that mere trespass by itself does not constitute fourth amendment invasion), cert. denied,405 U.S. 947 (1972).
30. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
31. Id.
32. This conclusion- follows despite the Court's own admission that "the Fourth
Amendment cannot be translated into a general constitutional 'right to privacy.'" Id
at 350.
33. This phrase, now a cliche, never actually appeared in any of the three opinions of the Katz decision.
34. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). The test is most commonly
employed implicitly, as the courts frequently abbreviate it as the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test. The United States Supreme Court even appears to have adopted
this approach. See, e.g., United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 8 (1973); United States
v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751-52 (1971); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968). See generally Peebles, The Uninvited CanineNose and the Right to Privacy: Some Thoughts on
Katz and Dogs, 11 GA. L. RFv. 75, 79-83 (1976-77).
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able and therefore not proscribed by the Constitution.35 Significantly, the Court rejected this argument, 36 holding
instead that "searches conducted outside the judicial process,
without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment - subject only to
a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions. ' 37 As no such exception was applicable in the tapping
of Katz' calls, the intrusion was unreasonble and proscribed
by the Constitution.
The Katz decision, then, apparently mandates a two-part
inquiry in fourth amendment analysis. First, one must determine whether a given intrusion constitutes a fourth
amendment search. 38 According to Justice Harlan's concurrence, an intrusion is a search if it encroaches upon the
searchee's reasonable expectation of privacy. 39 If it is determined that a search has occurred, it must then be determined whether the search was reasonable. 40 The Katz
majority mandates that a search is unreasonable unless it is
supported by prior judicial approval or falls within one of
the limited exceptions.4 '
This deceptively simple analysis has experienced some
deterioration in recent years. The courts today are reluctant
to apply it to canine sniff searches, thus opposing the mandate of Katz. In rejecting the Katz analysis, these courts subscribe to the unenlightened thinking of Olmstead and its
progeny. This is a regrettable trend which must be opposed.
It is the thesis of this Comment that, should the Katz analysis apply at all, it should apply to all fourth amendment intrusions in an undiluted form.

35. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 356-57.
36. The significance of this is that, in rejecting the Government's argument, the

Court tied the warrant clause to the reasonableness requirement of the fourth amendment. Peebles, supra note 34, at 80-81.
37. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 (footnotes omitted). For a list of these exceptions, see
infra note 241.
38. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 352-53.

39. See id.at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). See also United States v. White, 401
U.S. 745, 751-52 (1971).
40. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 354-57.
41. See id. at 357.
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B.

A BriefDigression.- Plain View

Among the "specifically established and well-delineated ' 42 exceptions to the fourth amendment warrant requirement is that of plain view. The plain view doctrine provides
that "objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a
right to be in the position to have that view are subject to
seizure and may be introduced into evidence. ' 43 The justification for this exception is the notion that an officer who

merely observes something while on duty is not engaged in a
search; therefore, no search warrant is necessary. 44 The Katz
Court alluded to this in commenting that "[wihat a person
knowingly exposes to the public . . . is not a subject of
Fourth Amendment protection. 45
The plain view doctrine 46 frequently collides with Katz'

"reasonable expectation of privacy" formulation; there is an

inherent tension between the two concepts which is not ca-

pable of simple reconciliation. This tension is readily recognized when one considers the qualifiers which describe the
respective doctrines: plain view and reasonableexpectation
of privacy. The difficulty lies in defining the border between
that which one may expect will be honored with privacy and
that which is nonetheless in plain view. The conflict is par-

ticularly evident in cases involving nontrespassory intru-

sions, such as electronic tracking devices47 and canine sniff
42. Id.
43. Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968) (per curiam). The plain
view doctrine was more clearly elucidated in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443, 464-74 (1971). See Moylan, The Plain View Doctrine: Unexpected Child of the
Great "SearchIncident" GeographyBattle,26 MERCER L. REV.1047 (1975) (discussing Coolidge limitations on plain view).
44. Under the plain view exception to the warrant requirement, no search is
deemed to have occurred in the first instance. In this regard, the plain view exception
is unlike the other warrant requirement exceptions. See infra note 241 for a list of
these exceptions.
45. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
46. The doctrine is not limited to the sense of sight. See, e.g., United States v.
Jackson, 588 F.2d 1046 (5th Cir.) (plain hearing), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979);
United States v. Muckenthaler, 584 F.2d 240 (8th Cir. 1978) (plain hearing); United
States v. Johnston, 497 F.2d 397 (9th Cir. 1974) (plain smell).
47. See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 103 S.Ct. 1081 (1983) (permitting use of
electronic tracking device); United States v. Michael, 622 F.2d 744 (5th Cir.) (permitting use of electronic tracking device), cert. denied,454 U.S. 950 (1980); United States
v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1975) (disallowing use of electronic tracking device), af'd en banc, 537 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1976).
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searches.48 One must inquire whether that which an officer
detects with the aid of a nontrespassory investigative tool is
really in plain view, considering that it could not have been
detected without the use of such a tool. Conversely, does a
person have a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding
an item which is only "exposed" to the public to the degree
that it is detectable by highly sophisticated equipment? The
development of electronic surveillance technology raises the
issue of how far the plain view doctrine may be extended
before it swallows up the privacy protections afforded by the
Katz decision.
It will be seen that a number of state and federal courts
apply a variant of the plain view doctrine to justify the propriety of sniff searches. 49 This invocation of the doctrine is
improper and symptomatic of the difficulty courts have experienced in dealing with the issue.
III.

THE CANINE SNIFF SEARCH CASES: DEVELOPMENT
OF THE LAW

A.

The Eary Years

It was not until the mid-1970s that the courts first began
considering the constitutionality of canine sniff searches.5
The first federal circuit court to pass on the issue did so in a
cursory, conclusive manner.-' In response to the defendant's
constitutional challenge, the court noted sharply: "We think
the argument is frivolous. ' 52 Inexplicably, the court saw no
53
reason to further articulate its reasoning.
The federal district court which decided United States v.
Solis54 employed a more extensive analysis in reaching an
48. See infra part III.
49. See, e.g., United States v. Bronstein, 521 F.2d 459, 461 (2d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 918 (1976). See also infra notes 89-104 and accompanying text.
50. The use of drug detecting dogs did not become prevalent until the early
1970s. See Comment, supra note 10, at 414-15 n.22 (detector dogs introduced in 1970
in response to increasing drug traffic).
51. See United States v. Fulero, 498 F.2d 748 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (per curiam).
52. Id. at 749.
53. This failure seems particularly delinquent in light of the fact that there was
substantial precedent in California courts which held oppositely. See infra notes 13539 and accompanying text.
54. 393 F. Supp. 325 (C.D. Cal. 1975), rev'd,536 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1976).
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opposite conclusion. There, the court dealt with a case in
which trained dogs were dispatched to search the defendant's parked semi-trailer in response to a tip from an anonymous informer.5 5 In assessing the constitutionality of the
sniff search, the court resorted immediately to a consideration of Katz v. UnitedStates,56 observing that "Katz involved
the uninvited electronic ear, whereas this case involves the
uninvited canine nose. 57 To determine whether a search
occurred, the court went on to question "whether Solis had a
. . .reasonable expectation that the interior of his closed
trailer. ..would be treated as a private place and [as such]
would not be subject to the olfactory intrusion by trained
Government dogs in the absence of a search warrant issued
'5 8
upon probable cause.
The court concluded that Solis did have such an expectation regarding the privacy of his closed trailer, and therefore,
"the use of the dogs constituted a search per se under the
Fourth Amendment. 59 In reaching this conclusion, the
court relied heavily upon the fact that Solis had completely
enclosed his trailer, thus keeping its contents from public
view.6 ° It seems also that the court just naturally recoiled at
the thought of pervasive electronic and canine monitoring of
persons - a reaction exhibited by few other courts.6 '
Before being overruled, the Solis decision was soon followed by United States v. Bronstein,62 probably the most frequently cited sniff-search case. The Bronstein case involved
a scenario typical of airport luggage search incidents: Acting
55. Solis, 393 F. Supp. at 325-26. The informant reported to a DEA agent that
defendant's semi-trailer contained 2,000 pounds of marijuana. Id
56. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
57. Sols, 393 F. Supp. at 327.
58. Id.
59. Id
60. Id The court also observed that the smell of marijuana which the dogs detected was likewise concealed from public view or smell. But see United States v.
Bronstein, 521 F.2d 459, 461 (2d Cir. 1975) (odor which is detectable by dog is exposed to public), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 918 (1976).
61. But see Doe v. Renfrow, 451 U.S. 1022 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari); Jones v. Latexo Indep. School Dist., 499 F. Supp. 223 (E.D. Tex.
1980).
62. 521 F.2d 459 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 918 (1976).
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on a tip from a reliable informant,63 DEA agents met the
defendants' suspect luggage at its destination-airport with
Meiska, a "canine cannabis connoisseur. ' 64 Upon sniffing
the luggage, the dog exhibited a positive reaction, leading to
the apprehension of the defendants and a search of their luggage, in which contraband was discovered.
In approving
of Meiska's sniff search, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
proposed a plain smell rationale to justify the procedure.
The court reasoned that because there would have been no
search had the agents themselves smelled the odor of marijuana, the detection of it by the trained dogs was likewise
proper.66 The court rejected the contention that "the police
are limited to the resources of their physical senses and that
the use of scientific, or, in this case, canine assistance . . . is
impermissible. ' 67 Rather, the court felt that the "law is settled contrariwise,' 68 making the use of sense-enhancing devices permissible in criminal investigation.69
The Bronstein court also strongly emphasized the nonintrusive nature of the sniff search. Because the dog reacted
only to contraband - and thus did not disclose the complete
contents of the suspects' luggage,7 0 but only the presence or
absence of contraband - the court distinguished the sniffing
63. Id.at 460. The informant was an airline ticket agent who observed defendants exhibiting suspicious behavior: "Each carried two large new suitcases all of
about the same size, shape and weight and all equipped with combination locks. Although they did not purchase their tickets together and appeared to act as strangers to
each other, [they] were later seen . . . to be talking together like old friends." Id.
64. Id The phrase was original to this court. See also State v. Morrow, 128 Ariz.
309, - 625 P.2d 898, 902 (1981); People v. Price, 54 N.Y.2d 557, 562, 431 N.E.2d
267, 269, 446 N.Y.S.2d 906, 908 (1981).
65. Bronstein, 521 F.2d at 460.
66. See id at 461. "We fail to understand how the detection of the odoriferous
drug by the . . . canine senses here employed alters the situation and renders the
police procedure constitutionally suspect." Id
67. Id. at 462.
68. Id.
69. But see infra text accompanying notes 191-95 (distinction between devices
which truly enhance the senses and those which replace the senses).
70. Bronstein, 521 F.2d at 463. The court specifically noted that "the intrusion
...was aimed not at the person." Id. Cf Horton v. Goose Creek Consol. Indep.
School Dist., 690 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1982) (sniff search of persons), cert. denied, 103 S.
Ct. 3536 (1983); Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ind. 1979) (same), afdin
part, 631 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,451 U.S. 1022 (1981); Jones v. Latexo
Indep. School Dist., 499 F. Supp. 223 (E.D. Tex. 1980) (same).

1984]

KATZ AND DOGS

from other less discriminate investigatory tools. 7 I Finally,
the court noted in approval that the powers of the dog were
employed only after a showing of reasonable suspicion.72
Regarding this point, the court distinguished the Solis decision on the grounds that that case involved "a tip from an
informer of unproven reliability. 73
Less than one year after the Bronstein case was decided,
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district
court's holding in United States v. Solis. 74 In what can best
be termed a disjointed opinion, the court advanced a potpourri of justifications for sanctioning sniff searches. The
plain smell theory from the Bronstein decision was repeated:
"[E]vidence acquired by unaided human senses from with-

out a protected area is not considered an illegal invasion of
privacy, but is usable under [the plain view exception] ...
Odors so detected may furnish evidence of probable cause of
'most persuasive character.' 75 Also influential in the
court's decision was the prior founded suspicion of the pres77
ence of contraband; 76 the nonintrusiveness of the search;
the discriminate nature of the search;78 and its relative inoffensiveness. 79 These factors combined to convince the court
that "the use of the dogs was not unreasonable under the

circumstances and therefore was not a prohibited search

80
under the fourth amendment."

71. See Bronstein, 521 F.2d 462-63.
72. See id. at 463.
73. Id. at 461 n.2 (emphasis added).
74. 536 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1976). For the factual background of this case, see
supra notes 54-61 and accompanying text.
75. Solis, 536 F.2d at 881. The court inexplicably failed to continue with this
thought and articulate a complete plain smell standard.
76. See id. at 882. This suspicion was "based on the partial corroboration of the
informant's statements by confirming the location of the trailer, the license described
and the presence of the talc, known to be associated with the masking of marijuana
odor." Id.
77. See id The court was apparently impressed that there was no physical trespass upon the trailer.
78. See id.at 883.
79. See id. Regarding this, the court observed that there was "no embarrassment
to or search of the person." Id.
80. Id. This language implies that the court deemed the intrusion a search, but a
reasonable one not proscribed by the fourth amendment. Such a conclusion conflicts
with the court's own statement: "We do not agree that the use of the dogs here constituted a search but rather a monitoring of the air ...." Id. at 881. This inconsis-
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The second Solis decision is most disappointing for its
utter disregard of the Katz standard. Although it was early
noted that Katz' "'reasonable expectation of privacy' [is
what]. . we take to be the test, to be applied to the circumstances of each case," 8' the test was never really considered.
The court simply failed to inquire whether the defendant
had an expectation of privacy regarding his semi-trailer; instead, the circumstances and alleged reasonableness of the
sniff search were examined and approved.
This error was repeated by the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals in United States v. Venema.82 That case dealt with
the warrantless sniff search of defendant's rented locker facility.83 In considering defendant's constitutional challenge,
the court inquired whether he had a justifiable expectation
of privacy in the areaway outside his locker door, that being
the airspace which the dog actually "searched. ' 84 In concluding that there was no such expectation of privacy, the
court observed that defendant was warned by the manager
that from time to time "she allowed the police on the premises. . . to use their dogs for the purpose of detecting marijuana. . . . In view of such warning. . . defendant is in a
poor position to assert that he had a justifiable expectation
to
'85
privacy in the areaway outside the locker door.
The fallacy in this reasoning seems clear. The mere announcement that constitutional rights will be violated cannot
justify their subsequent violation. Were it otherwise, all
fourth amendment protection could be suspended with an
announcement to that effect. But more fundamentally, the
Venema court erred in failing to address the proper inquiry
in the first instance, that being, did defendant have a reasontency was purportedly resolved later in United States v. Beale, 674 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir.
1982) (interpreting Solis as allowing sniff search only upon reasonable suspicion), vacated and remanded,103 S.Ct. 3529 (1983), aff'd, 736 F.2d 1289 (1984).
81. Solis, 536 F.2d at 882.
82. 563 F.2d 1003 (10th Cir. 1977).
83. Id. at 1004. Narcotics agents had observed suspicious deliveries and dispatches from the locker. With permission of the owner of the locker facility, the
agents brought a detector dog to sniff the outside area of defendant's locker. The dog
reacted positively; upon the issuance of a warrant, the locker was searched, and
agents found LSD, marijuana, and hashish. Id.at 1004-05.
84. Id. at 1006.
85. Id.
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able expectation of privacy regarding the interior of his
locker? The court mistakenly focused on the areaway immediately outside the locker door, presumably in consideration
of the fact that the actual matter that the canine sniffed was
located there. But merely because the evidence is secured
from without the enclosed area in question does not require
a shift of the focus of inquiry. Were this the case, the tapping of Katz would have been permissible in that it
"searched" the area outside of the confines of the telephone
booth for the minute sound vibrations that evidenced the
conversation occurring therein.8 6 In erring as it did, the
Venema court effectively ignored the Katz standard, thus allowing its conclusion that "the act of [the dog] sniffing the air
' 87
outside the defendant's locker did not constitute a search.
.

The Trend Continues

The precedent established by the federal circuit courts in
the 1970s has been faithfully adhered to in this decade. The
most common rationale offered in support of the constitutionality of canine sniff searches continues to be the plain
smell doctrine. Few courts approving the use of detector
dogs fail to mention plain smell in establishing the procedure's legitimacy; 88 no such court has refuted it. In United
States v. Burns,89 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals quoted
extensively from United States v. Bronstein,90 apparently

86. Similarly, a magnetometer "searches" the area outside one's pockets in order
to detect the fluctuating magnetic fields which reveal the pockets' contents.
87. Venema, 563 F.2d at 1007. The court apparently held, then, that there was no
search in the first instance. Other early cases which dealt with the canine sniff search
include: United States v. Meyer, 536 F.2d 963 (1st Cir. 1976) (sniff is a search, but is
reasonable); State v. Martinez, 26 Ariz. App. 210, 547 P.2d 62 (sniff of a car is not a
search), affid, 113 Ariz. 345, 554 P.2d 1272 (1976); State v. Quatsling, 24 Ariz. App.
105, 536 P.2d 226 (1975) (challenge to sniff search is frivolous), cert. denied,424 U.S.
945 (1976); and People v. Campbell, 67 Ill. 2d 308, 367 N.E.2d 949 (1977) (sniff is not
a search), cert. denied,435 U.S. 942 (1978).
88. A notable exception is United States v. Place, 103 S.Ct. 2637 (1983), which
fails to mention the plain smell doctrine. See also Mata v. State, 380 So. 2d 1157 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
89. 624 F.2d 95 (10th Cir.), cert. denied 449 U.S. 954 (1980).
90. 521 F.2d 459 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied,424 U.S. 918 (1976). See supra notes
62-73 and accompanying text.
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adopting that court's plain smell standard. 9' The Fourth
Circuit reached a similar result with United States v. Sullivan,92 when it observed: "It cannot be questioned that an
odor. . . if detected by the sensory organs of man would not
assistance provided by
constitute a search. . . . We find the 93

[the detector dogs] to be reasonable."
State courts have also applied the plain smell doctrine in
sniff search cases.

In State v. Morrow,9 4 the Arizona

Supreme Court depended heavily on the doctrine in approving a canine search. That court noted that "[w]hat emits
from a bag, including. . . an odor, [is] exposed to the public
and [is] not . . . protected by the Fourth Amendment ...

That [which] the dog smells is in the area surrounding the
96
bag . . . itself. 95 Curiously, in reaching this conclusion,
the court looked only to the plain smell doctrine, virtually
ignoring other persuasive arguments in its favor. 97
The California Supreme Court reached a similar decision in People v. Mayberry.98 The court there likened the
"escaping smell of contraband from luggage" 99 to the "emanation of a fluid leaking from a container. The odor is detectable by the nose, as the leak is visible to the eye ....
Our conclusion is not altered by the fact that it [was the
91. See Burns, 624 F.2d at 101. In so doing, the court observed: "As of the time
of their arrest, appellants' legitimate expectations with regard to the locked briefcase
were that it would remain unopened absent warrant authorization. The dog's mere
sniffing of such did not offend constitutional guarantees." Id. Thus, the court effectively ignored the ruling in Katz. See also United States v. Venema, 563 F.2d 1003
(10th Cir. 1977), discussed supra notes 82-87 and accompanying text.
92. 625 F.2d 9 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 923 (1981).
93. Id. at 13 (citations omitted). See also United States v. Goldstein, 635 F.2d
356, 361 (5th Cir.) (equating dog's smelling odor with officer's smelling it), cert. denied,452 U.S. 962 (1981).
94. 128 Ariz. 309, 625 P.2d 898 (1981).
95. Id. at _ 625 P.2d at 901-02. This comment suggests a return to the propertyoriented approach of Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). See supranotes
15-23 and accompanying text.
96. Interestingly, the court's conclusion was that "[tihe sniffing of the dog was not
a search." Morrow, 128 Ariz. at_, 625 P.2d at 902. Actually, no one sniffed the dog;
rather the court merely confused its grammer as it did its reasoning.
97. The only credible argument which supports the constitutionality of canine
sniff searches is that which establishes the accuracy, discrimination, and nonintrusiveness of the procedure. See infra notes 202-17 and accompanying text.
98. 31 Cal. 3d 335, 644 P.2d 810, 182 Cal. Rptr. 617 (1982).
99. Id. at 343, 644 P.2d at 814, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 621.
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dog's] nose and not [the] handler's which detected the
odor."100 Thus the court held that there was no fourth
amendment search in the first instance when a trained canine sniffed airport luggage.' 0 '
Likewise, the Hawaii Supreme Court adopted this rationale1 0 2 in holding that "[j]ust as there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in items left in the plain view of an
officer lawfully in the position from which he observes
[them], there can be no reasonable expectation that plainly
noticeable odors will remain private."10 3 And similarly, the
Washington Court of Appeals declared in conclusory terms
that canine sniff searches "properly . . . come within the
'plain smell' doctrine adopted by the majority of jurisdictions which have considered the question."' °
Regardless of the courts' various justifications for permitting the use of detector dogs, it is significant that the early
courts that dealt with the issue almost unanimously disapproved of their use in a dragnet, exploratory fashion. Even
United States v. Bronstein,05 so adamant in its approval of
the sniff search, pointedly noted that the dog there "was not
employed in a dragnet operation directed against all flight
passengers but rather on the basis of reliable information
that reasonably triggered the surveillance employed
there."' 1 6 This reservation, however, seems to be eroding
rapidly, as many courts this decade have explicitly approved
07
of dragnet operations.1
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals at one point
evinced an intention to avoid this trend. In UnitedStates v.
Klein, 08 that court approved the use of canines in drug detection; however, it was particularly noted that "[t]his is not
a case in which we need to confront the thorny problem of
an indiscriminate, dragnet-type sniffing expedition. Rather,
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id
Id
State v. Groves, 65 Hawaii 104, 649 P.2d 366 (1982).
Id.at _, 649 P.2d at 372.
State v. Wolohan, 23 Wash. App. 813, _ 598 P.2d 421, 425 (1979).
521 F.2d 459 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied,424 U.S. 918 (1976).
Id at 463.
See infra notes 112-31 and accompanying text.
626 F.2d 22 (7th Cir. 1980).
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this is a case in which authorities already had a reasonable
suspicion to believe that the luggage contained
contraband."' 10 9
The Hawaii Supreme Court was more adamant in its rejection of dragnet sniff searches. That court declared in unambiguous language: "[We] will not condone the use of
these dogs in general exploratory searches or for indiscriminate dragnet-type searches." 110 Similarly, a federal district
court, in striking down as unconstitutional the wholesale, indiscriminate sniff search of an entire student body, identified
as the principal factor in reaching its decision the "sweeping,
undifferentiated, and indiscriminate scope" of the search."'
However, most courts in recent years have been more accepting of dragnet sniffs. A Washington appellate court in
State v. Wolohan" 2 felt no inhibition in allowing an indiscriminate, exploratory sniff search of a bus packaging
area.1 3 The court reasoned that because the defendant's
parcel exuded odorous molecules into the range of the detector dog's smell, defendant could have no reasonable expectation of privacy." 4 Thus, there was no search, and the
general rule prohibiting exploratory searches was therefore
inapplicable. 15
State v. Morrow 116 isin accord. In response to defendant's indication that in previous cases which permitted the
sniff search "there was reason to suspect the presence of contraband before the dogs were called,""' 7 the Arizona
Supreme Court maintained that the presence or absence of
suspicion was unimportant. "If a dog's sniff is not a search,
then it is immaterial whether there was pre-sniff knowl109. Id at 27. But see Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ind. 1979) (approving of generalized dragnet search), aft'd inpart,631 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied,451 U.S. 1022 (1981).
110. State v. Groves, 65 Hawaii 104, _., 649 P.2d 366, 373 (1982).
111. Jones v. Latexo Indep. School Dist., 499 F. Supp.. 223, 234 (E.D. Tex. 1980).
See infra notes 158-66 and accompanying text.
112. 23 Wash. App. 813, 598 P.2d 421 (1979).
113. See id at _, 598 P.2d at 425. Agents had customarily led their detector dog
through the area, allowing it to sniff all parcels. Id at _ 598 P.2d at 422.
598 P.2d at 424.
114. See i. at,
at , 598 P.2d at 424-25.
115. See id.
116. 128 Ariz. 309, 625 P.2d 898 (1981).
117. Id.at _ 625 P.2d at 902.
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edge."' 8 Similarly, the California Supreme Court approved
of the San Diego Police Department's practice of conducting
routine exploratory sniffing expeditions in the baggage area
of the San Diego International Airport. 19
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals suggested such an approach in United States v. Goldstein.120 There, defendants
were observed to exhibit suspicious behavior matching that
described in the drug courier profile. 12

Defendants con-

tended that reference to the drug courier profile did not supply the reasonable and articulable suspicion necessary to
justify the detention of their luggage. The court rejected this
argument, observing that "[i]t is because [the dog's] sniff did
not constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment that we hold that reasonable and articulable
suspicion is not required before a [dog may be122used] to sniff
luggage in the custody of a common carrier."'
In Doe v. Renfrow, 23 possibly the most disconcerting of
all canine sniff search cases, the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals approved of the dragnet sniff search of an entire
student body. 124 In response to what was perceived as a
growing drug problem, school officials in Highland, Indiana,
arranged for an exploratory sniff search of each junior and
118. Id.
119. People v. Mayberry, 31 Cal. 3d 335, 644 P.2d 810, 182 Cal. Rptr. 617 (1982).
A Narcotics Task Force officer customarily conducted such an exploratory search
with full permission of airport authorities. He concentrated the search on particular
inbound flights originating in Florida. The asserted basis for this procedure was the
prediction that there would be "a three-quarters of one percent chance that someone's
checked luggage would contain contraband." Id. at 353, 644 P.2d at 821, 182 Cal.
Rptr. at 628 (Bird, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). Actually, the likelihood was
even less. Id. at 354 n.12, 644 P.2d at 821 n.12, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 628 n.12.
120. 635 F.2d 356 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,452 U.S. 962 (1981).
121. Id. at 360. Such suspicious behavior included the fact that defendants took
an early morning ffight from a drug source city (Orlando, Florida); that they wore
beards, dungarees, and boots; that they exhibited a seemingly false act of being strangers to each other, that their tickets and luggage bore inconsistent names; and that
they paid for their unreserved tickets in cash. Id. at 358.
122. Id.at 361-62.
123. 475 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ind. 1979), affdinpart,631 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied,451 U.S. 1022 (1981). Unlike most of the cases considered in this Comment, the Doe decision was a civil rights action and not a criminal case.
124. The 2,780 students of Highland High School, including the junior high
school students, were sniff searched. Doe, 631 F.2d at 92.
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senior high school class. 125 During the two and one-half
hour investigation, the dogs reacted positively to a total of
fifty students.1 26 Thirteen year old Doe was among the fifty.
Even after emptying her pockets, the dogs exhibited a positive reaction upon sniffing her; 127 thereupon, she was removed to a nurse's station, where a nude body search was
conducted. Again, no contraband was found. It was ultimately discovered that the plaintiff had played with her pet
dog the morning of the sniff search. The pet was in heat,
and apparently the lingering odors which the child exuded
elicited the erroneous positive reactions from the detector
dogs. 2 8 The United States District Court for the Northern
District of Indiana nonetheless held that "the sniffing of a
trained narcotic detecting canine is not a search."'' 29 Conceding that other federal courts had suggested the requirement that "the law enforcement officers [have] previous
independent information or 'tips' concerning the whereabouts of the drugs" that are subsequently detected by the
dogs, 30 the court concluded that such founded suspicion existed in this instance, in that there was "outside independent
3
evidence indicating drug abuse within the school."' '
The Doe case is most significant in that it indicates the
fallibility of trained detector dogs. It is commonly recounted
that the canine sniff is highly discriminate in that it reacts
only to contraband, thus exposing nothing to the authorities
except the presence or absence of contraband. As was made
evident in Doe, this is not true; the trained dog reacts to be-

125. Doe, 475 F. Supp. at 1016. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals adopted
the district court's opinion as its own. See Doe, 631 F.2d at 92.
126. Doe, 475 F. Supp. at 1017.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1019.
130. Id.at 1021.
131. Id The issue of the rights of public school students, which is intimately
involved in cases which involve sniff searchs in schools, is vastly beyond the scope of
this Comment. For a discussion of this topic, see Gardner, Sniffngfor Drugs in the
Classroom -Perspectives on FourthAmendment Scope, 74 Nw. U.L. REV. 803 (1980);
Note, The Constitutionality of Canine Searches in the Classroom,71 J. CRIM. LAW &
CRIMINOLOGY 39 (1980); Comment, Search and Seizure in Public Schools: Are Our
Children'sRights Going to the Dogs, 24 ST. Louis U.L.J. 119 (1979).
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guiling scents other than contraband. 132 Therefore, the sniff
search has the potential for being terribly indiscriminate. It
is important to observe that Doe was not the only victim of
error; rather, the dogs there reacted to a total of fifty subjects, only seventeen of which were found to possess contraband. 33 Two other federal courts have rejected the Doe
analysis, holding instead that an exploratory sniff search in a
school constitutes a prohibited fourth amendment search. 34
C. The Dissenting Courts

While the majority of courts have held that the canine
sniff search was not a fourth amendment intrusion in the
first instance, and was therefore not affected by that amendment's strictures, a few courts have held otherwise, contending that the sniff is a search. As shall be seen, however, these
same courts nonetheless approve of the use of the procedure.
The California Court of Appeal early recognized that a
sniffing investigation constitutes a fourth amendment search.
As early as 1973 the California courts established the necessity for probable cause prior to conducting sniff searches. 135
This provided the basis for later state courts to heartily disapprove of exploratory sniffing expeditions. 36 In People v.
Evans 37 the court concluded that the use of a trained dog
without prior knowledge or information regarding the presence of contraband "was . . . a violation of [defendant's]

Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable search and
seizure,"' 138 as it constituted an "impermissible invasion of
132. In Jones v. Latexo Indep. School Dist., 499 F. Supp. 223, 228 n.2 (E.D. Tex.
1980), the court noted that dogs have been known to respond to such substances as
tobacoo, lighter fluid, nonprescription drugs, and the odors of other animals.
133. See Doe, 451 U.S. 1022, 1024 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari). This represents only a 34% accuracy rate.
134. Horton v. Goose Creek Consol. Indep. School Dist., 690 F.2d 470 (5th Cir.
1982), cert. denied,103 S. Ct. 3536 (1983); Jones v. Latexo Indep. School Dist., 499 F.
Supp. 223 (E.D. Tex. 1980).
135. See, e.g., People v. Furman, 30 Cal. App. 3d 454, 106 Cal. Rptr. 366 (1973).
136. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 51 Cal. App. 3d 346, 124 Cal. Rptr. 253 (1975);
People v. Evans, 65 Cal. App. 3d 924, 134 Cal. Rptr. 436 (1977) (discussed infra notes
137-39 and accompanying text).
137. 65 Cal. App. 3d 924, 134 Cal. Rptr. 436 (1977).
138. Id. at 937, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 443.
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[the defendant's] reasonable expectations of privacy."' 139
An Ohio court followed California's lead in State v. Elkins.140 Strictly applying the two-pronged analysis of Katz v.
United States,'4 ' the court there inquired whether the sniff
amounted to a search, and, if a search, whether it was reasonable. 42 Regarding the first inquiry, the court resolved
that "it must be answered in the affirmative. By the use of a
sophisticated device, albeit flesh and blood, the user perceived something entirely hidden from human senses, enhanced or unenhanced."' 143 However, the court went on to
conclude that this intrusion "did not constitute an unreasonable search. ....
" and was therefore not in violation of the
fourth amendment.' 4
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals employed a similar
analysis in holding that a canine sniff search constitutes a
fourth amendment intrusion. In so holding the Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Beale,145 chose to make a distinct
split from precedent. 146 The case involved the search and
apprehension of a suspected drug courier. 47 Rather than
treat the issue in "absolute terms,"'' 4 8 the court declared that
"the use of a canine's keen senses of smell to detect the pres139. Id at 934, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 441. See also People v. Denman, 112 Cal. App.
3d 1003, 169 Cal. Rptr. 742 (1980); People v. Nagdeman, 110 Cal. App. 3d 404, 168
Cal. Rptr. 16 (1980); People v. Lester, 101 Cal. App. 3d 613, 161 Cal. Rptr. 703 (1980).
These cases have been overruled by People v. Mayberry, 31 Cal. 3d 335, 644 P.2d 810,
182 Cal. Rptr. 617 (1982) (holding that a nonintrusive olfactory investigation was not
a search).
140. 47 Ohio App. 2d 307, 354 N.E.2d 716 (1976).
141. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
142. See Elkins,47 Ohio App. 2d at _ 354 N.E.2d at 717.
143. Id at , 354 N.E.2d at 718. The court equated the use of the drug sniffing
dog with wiretapping: "[This] case is comparable to. . . Katz where the electronic
device attached to the outside of the enclosed telephone booth constituted a search
even though there was no physical intrusion into the enclosure." Id Cf.United
States v. Bums, 624 F.2d 95, 101 (10th Cir.) (emphasizing lack of intrusion in support
of legitimacy of sniff search), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 954 (1980); United States v.
Venema, 563 F.2d 1003, 1005 (10th Cir. 1977) (same).
144. Ekins, 47 Ohio App. 2d at , 354 N.E.2d at 719.
145. 674 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated andremande, 103 S.Ct. 3529 (1983),
aft'd, 736 F.2d 1289 (1984).
146. See supra part III A & B.
147. Beale and his accomplice matched certain traits from the drug courier profile. Their luggage was exposed to a detector dog, and upon the dog's positive reaction, defendant was apprehended. Beale, 674 F.2d at 1328.
148. Id. at 1330.
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ence of contraband within. . luggage is a Fourth Amendment intrusion, albeit a limited one that may be conducted
without a warrant and may be based on an officer's
'founded'4 9 or 'articulable' suspicion, rather than probable
cause." 1

In reaching this conclusion, the court rejected the plain
smell doctrine as being entirely inapplicable, 50 and stressed
the reasonable expectation of privacy persons have regarding their luggage.' 5' In noting the similarity between the
Katz case and the case before the court, in that the former
involved the intruding human ear while the latter involved
the intruding canine nose, 52 the court seemingly began to
draw an analogy between electronic surveillance and sniff

searches. 153 But the court went on to resist the full implications of such an analogy by distinguishing between indiscriminate electronic "searches" and the discriminating nose
of the trained dog. 154 Thus, apparently ignoring its own
strenuous argument in favor of the inviolability of one's luggage, 55 the court then heartily56approved of such an effective

but subtle investigative tool.

A federal district court similarly considered the propriety

of an exploratory sniff search of a student body, not unlike
149. Id at 1335 (emphasis in original). The court maintained that such a holding
was "consistent with the unarticulated reasoning of United States v. Solis;. . . United
States v. Bronstein; and United States v. Fulero." Id (footnotes omitted). A more
accurate assessment would be that the Beale decision was consistent with the practical
result of each of these cases. See infra text accompanying notes 218-22.
150. See Beale, 674 F.2d at 1333. For a discussion of the merits of the plain smell"
doctrine as applied to canine sniff search cases, see infra notes 188-201 and accompanying text.
151. See 674 F.2d at 1331-32.
152. Id. at 1334.
153. "To paraphrase Katz, what Beale sought to exclude when he locked his suitcase was not only the intruding human eye - it was also the intruding canine nose."
Id.
154. See id.
155. The court stated: "One who reposes his personal effects, including contraband, in a locked suitcase, is surely entitled to assume that a trained canine will not
broadcast its incriminating contents to the authorities." Id
156. Id The court emphasized the accuracy and reliability of the dogs, which
ensure a discriminate and nonintrusive search. Id The court then, however, declared
that a dragnet search would be "totally unpalatable," apparently contradicting its
own confidence in the nonintrusiveness of the procedure. Id at 1335-36 n.20.
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that which was under review in Doe v. Renfrow.157 Unlike its
federal circuit court counterpart, the court in Jones v. Latexo
Independent School District158 struck down the procedure as
unconstitutional. Employing the two-pronged Katz test,1 9
the court held that "[tihe use of the 'sniffer dog' . . . was a
search under the fourth amendment."1 60 Further, the search
"exceeded the bounds of reasonableness," and was therefore
disallowed.1 61 In assessing the reasonableness of the search,
the court conceded both that "the degree of intrusion committed by [the sniffing dog] is somewhat less extensive than
that stemming from a physical search," 162 and that because
the dog "only signalled his trainer if contraband was de163
tected" the intrusion was of a highly discriminate nature.
Nonetheless, it was noted that the use of an animal such as
there involved - a large German Shepard trained as an attack dog - to sniff the persons of the students, some kindergarten-aged, "may offend the sensibilities" of the searchee64
more than the use of an electronic eavesdropping gadget.1
This factor is not present in the common airport drug courier
sniff search, in which the subject of the search is an inanimate object such as a suitcase. Only the most sensitive
among us would recoil at the thought of one's luggage being
nosed by a dog; many persons, however, would protest such
an inspection of one's body.
157. 475 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ind. 1979), a 'dinpart,631 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied,451 U.S. 1022 (1981).

158. 499 F. Supp. 223 (E.D. Tex. 1980). As noted previously, the topic of students' constitutional rights is beyond the scope of this Comment. See supra note 131.
In Jones,the dogs were permitted to sniff the students and the students' automobiles.

A dog reacted positively upon sniffing plaintiff, but a subsequent search revealed only
a cigarette lighter, a hairclip, and nasal spray. 499 F. Supp. at 228. It was conceded
that the dogs were known to positively respond to such noncontraband scents as tobacco, lighter fluid, nonprescription drugs, and other animals' odors. Id at 228 n.2.
159. "First, it must be determined whether a search of constitutional dimension
actually occurred. If it is found that a search occurred, the second issue is whether or
not the search was reasonable." Jones, 499 F. Supp. at 231.
160. Id. at 233.
161. Id. at 235.

162. Id at 233.
163. Id

164. Id at 233-34. The court noted that, in the process of sniffing the subjects,
the dogs frequently touched them; at least one child was reportedly "slobbered on" in
the course of being examined. Id
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The dog in Joneswas also employed to sniff the students'
automobiles, a scenario more in accord with the typical sniff
search case. The court again expressed little tolerance for
such an investigation, lamenting that "[t]he search was conducted in a blanket, indiscriminate manner without individualized suspicion of any kind."' 165 Presumably, the court
would have been more accepting of a canine search based on
reasonable suspicion, as it commented that "the state must
have a basis for subjecting a particular person to search
166
before intruding upon his privacy."
The court in Horton v. Goose Creek ConsolidatedIndependent School District,167 a case which involved a factual
scenario identical to that in Jones in all important respects,
arrived at a different conclusion. As did the Jonescourt, the
court in Horton considered both the use of the dogs in
searching the students and their use in searching the students' automobiles. Regarding the latter, the court adhered
to its earlier decision, United States v. Goldstein, 68 in approving of such use. In so doing, the court repeated its adherence to the plain smell rationale. 169 From there, however,
the court went on to consider the legitimacy of the sniff
searches of the students' persons. In consideration of the
personal intrusiveness and offensiveness of being subjected
to scrutinization by an animal, 70 it was held that such snif71
fing constituted an unreasonable search.'
The Horton decision is logically inconsistent. In approving of the sniff search of inanimate subjects, the court relied
on the plain smell theory with little thought; indeed, the
court actually allowed that "[an] aroma emanating from the
• . .person is considered exposed to public 'view' and, therefore, unprotected."' 172 No mention of the doctrine is made,
165. Id. at 235.
166. Id at 234.
167. 690 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 3536 (1983).
168. 635 F.2d 356 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 962 (1981). See also United
States v. Viera, 644 F.2d 509 (5th Cir.) (case from same circuit approving sniff search
of luggage), cert. denied,454 U.S. 867 (1981).
169. See Horton,690 F.2d at 477.
170. The dogs reportedly touched the students quite frequently while performing
the sniff searches. Id at 479.
171. See id at 481-82.
172. Id at 477 (emphasis added).
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however, in the court's consideration of the personal sniff
search. Apparently, the court overlooked this blatant analytical blunder. The result is an amazingly poorly reasoned
opinion.
D. United States v. Place
The United States Supreme Court recently considered
the constitutionality of the canine sniff search for the first
time. In United States v. Place,17 3 a 1983 case, the defendant,
a suspected drug courier, had his bags detained for ninety
minutes while they were being transported to another location to be examined by a detector dog. 174 In considering this
detention, the Court held that "the principles of Terry and its
progeny. . . permit [an] officer to detain. . . luggage briefly
to investigate the circumstances that [arouse] his suspicion,
provided that [such detention] is properly limited in
scope." 175 However, the reversal of defendant's conviction
was affirmed because "[the] length of the detention of [his]
luggage. .. [precluded] the conclusion that the seizure was
reasonable .... 176
The Court also considered the propriety of conducting a
sniff search of defendant's luggage. In approving of the procedure, the Court looked to the discriminate nature and the
nonintrusive character of the sniff search; most significant
was the fact that "the information obtained is limited. This
limited disclosure ensures that the owner of the property is
not subjected to the embarrassment and inconvenience entailed in less discriminate and more intrusive investigative
173. 103 S. Ct. 2637 (1983).
174. Defendant flew from Miami to New York's LaGuardia Airport. He was

initially detained in Miami International Airport, but no search was conducted. Officials at LaGuardia, however, decided to further investigate, and detained defendant's
luggage. The luggage was transported to New York's Kennedy Airport, where there
was a trained detector dog. Ninety minutes elapsed between the time the bags were
seized and the time the dog sniffed them and exhibited a positive reaction. Id. at

2639-40.
175. Id at 2644. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), established the authority of
police officers to make a limited intrusion on less than probable cause. See generally
Wiseman, The 'Reasonableness" of the Investigative Detention: An "Ad Hoc" Constitutional Test, 67 MARQ. L. REV. 641 (1984).
176. Place, 103 S. Ct. at 2645.
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methods."' 177 The Court made no mention of the plain smell
doctrine, making no attempt to apply it to the case before it.
The deficiency of the Place decision is not so much how
the issue was decided, but that it was decided at all. The
concurring justices properly chided the majority for reaching
the issue, charging that "an answer to the question is not
necessary to the decision." 178 Justice Brennan particularly
regretted that the majority reached the matter, observing
that it was not discussed before either the district court or the
court of appeals, and179was neither briefed nor argued before
the Supreme Court.
It is significant to note the narrowness with which the
Court worded its conclusion: "[T]he particular course of investigation that the agents intended to pursue here - exposure of respondent's luggage, which was located in a public
place, to a trained canine - did not constitute a 'search'
within the meaning the Fourth Amendment."' 80 The decision said nothing of personal searches. Considering the factual scenario with which the Court dealt, it may be
reasonable to conclude that the Court meant only to sanction the conventional airport drug courier sniff search.
E.

1984: The Status of the Law

United States v. Place' 8 1 represents the culmination of an
overwhelming trend among the courts. Effectively overruling United States v. Beale,182 the Place decision has established that, in federal courts, the sniff search of an inanimate
object does not constitute a fourth amendment intrusion in
the first instance. The sniff search of a person is an issue
which is less conclusively settled. Although one federal cir177. Id. at 2644.
178. Id. at 2653 (Blackmun, J., concurring). The issue need not have been considered because the Court had held that the dispossession of respondent's luggage was
excessively long, thus deciding the case.
179. See id.at 2651 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun indicated that
the complexity of the issue rendered an uninformed decision especially unwise. Id at
2653 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
180. Id at 2644-45.
181. 103 S.Ct. 2637 (1983).
182. 674 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1982), vacatedand remanded,103 S. Ct. 3529 (1983),
aj'd,736 F.2d 1289 (1984).
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cuit court has approved of the procedure,' 8 3 that holding has
been panned by commentators' 84 and rejected by subsequent
courts.' 85 The Supreme Court has avoided the issue, 18 6 but
Court has expressed his revulsion
at least one member of the
18 7
for the personal search.
It does not seem logical that the sniff search of luggage
should be permitted while the sniff search of one's person
should be disallowed. It appears clear that such a result is
based not on constitutional principles but on a natural distaste for having one's body examined by a dog. However,
the validity or invalidity of such a search should not turn
upon one's aversion to animals. Rather, both procedures
should survive or fall together. It is proper, then, to examine
the various justifications for permitting sniff searches, and
consider the soundness of the reasoning.
IV.

AN ASSESSMENT OF THE LOGIC

A. Plain Smell
Most courts which sanction the use of dogs for criminal
investigation depend upon the plain smell doctrine to justify
their position.' 88 As has been suggested previously, however,
plain smell has absolutely no application in the dog sniff
cases.
It is commonly repeated that "[w]hat a person knowingly
exposes to the public. . . is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection."'' 89 But to contend that the undetectable
odor of a contraband substance is "knowingly exposed to the
public" is absurd. An odor which cannot be detected by
even the keenest human nose is not exposed to the public 183. Doe v. Renfrow, 631 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1022
(1981).
184. See, e.g., Gardner, supra note 131; Note, supra note 131.
185. Horton v. Goose Creek Consol. Indep. School Dist., 690 F.2d 470 (5th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 3536 (1983); Jones v. Latexo Indep. School Dist., 499 F.
Supp. 223 (E.D. Tex. 1980).
186. See Horton v. Goose Creek Consol. Indep. School Dist., 103 S.Ct. 3536
(1983) (denial of certiorari); Doe v. Renfrow, 451 U.S. 1022 (1981) (same).
187. See Doe v. Renfrow, 451 U.S. 1022 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari).
188. See supra notes 88-104 and accompanying text.
189. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
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unless we mean to include trained canines in our assessment
of the "public." At the heart of the plain view - or plain
smell - doctrine is the requirement that the matter detected
be openly exposed. Matter which is utterly undetectable except by a specially trained animal with superhuman olfactory nerves is not so exposed. 190
The court in UnitedStates v. Bronsteint 91 saw no error in
equating the detection of odoriferous marijuana by the sniffing dog with its detection by a sniffing police officer.192 But
the court failed to recognize the obvious fact that the police
officer there could not smell the drug. As the Bronstein concurrence noted, the invocation of plain smell is therefore
rendered improper. 93 Nor is it correct to equate the dog
with a sense-enhancing device such as a flashlight. The dog
is not a sense-enhancer; rather, the dog's nose effectively replaces that of its master. In exploring about with a detector
dog, the police officer does not suddenly become able to detect previously undetectable odors; the officer never actually
smells anything, but instead relies entirely upon the behavior
of the dog. It thus seems proper to equate the trained dog
with a wiretap or magnetometer. Each is a non-human
method of "detecting the contents of a closed area without
physically entering it.' 1 94 While neither is particularly offensive, "each detects without actual
entry and without the en95
hancement of human senses."'1
The dissenting opinion in People v. M41ayberry 196 wisely
observed the inapplicability of the plain smell doctrine. The
justice there, noting that plain view mandates a "knowing"
exposure of contraband to the public, observed that "[it cannot] be said that appellant 'knowingly' exposed the contraband to the public, since he, not being a . . .trained dog
himself, would not have known that any aroma was escaping
190. The olfactory powers of a dog are said to be eight times that of a human's.
See United States v. Solis, 393 F. Supp. 325,326 (C.D. Cal. 1975), rev'4 536 F.2d 880
(9th Cir. 1976).
191. 521 F.2d 459 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied,424 U.S. 918 (1976).
192. See id. at 461.
193. See id. at 464 (Mansfield, J., concurring).
194. Id
195. Id
196. 31 Cal. 3d 335, 644 P.2d 810, 182 Cal. Rptr. 617 (1982).
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from his luggage."' 9 7
Because the sniffing dog constitutes an independent detection device, some courts have appropriately equated its
use with the use of electronic surveillance equipment. 198 The
molecules of marijuana that unavoidably escape the confines
of their housing, and are subsequently sniffed by the canine
and elicit its positive reaction, are not unlike the sound
waves that are harnassed by a wiretap, or the shifting magnetic fields that are registered by the magnetometer. Each
originates "from inside a private area and travel[s] beyond
its perimeters,"'' 99 unexposed to those among us who are not
equipped with supersensitive detection devices. Just as "no
real distinction can be drawn between the use of specially
trained dogs with superior olfactory powers and the use of
an electronic instrument which registers a smell which a
human cannot perceive, '' 200 no distinction can be drawn between the former and an electronic instrument which registers a sound which a human cannot perceive.
It appears that the court that would permit canine sniff
searches by reasoning that the detection of the odor by the
dog is equivalent to its detection by the police officer would
likewise be compelled to permit warrantless wiretapping.
For is not the detection of the minute sound vibrations by
the tap equivalent to the police officer hearing them personally, unaided? As Professor LaFave has responded, "this
simply is not So. '' 201 Considering that there is no logical basis for the application of a plain view variation in dog sniff
cases, it is genuinely curious that so many courts have
adopted such reasoning.
197. Id.at 350, 644 P.2d at 818, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 625 (Bird, J., dissenting).
198. See, e.g., United States v. Bronstein, 521 F.2d 459, 464 (2d Cir. 1975) (Mansfield, J., concurring); Jones v. Latexo Indep. School Dist., 499 F. Supp. 223, 233 (E.D.
Tex. 1980); People v. Price, 54 N.Y.2d 557, 566, 431 N.E.2d 267, 271, 446 N.Y.S.2d

906, 910 (1981). But see United States v. Beale, 674 F.2d 1327, 1334 (9th Cir. 1982)
(distinguishing sniffing dog from electronic surveillance equipment), vacated and re-

manded, 103 S.Ct. 3529 (1983), aft'd, 736 F.2d 1289 (1984).
199. People v. Price, 54 N.Y.2d 557, 566, 431 N.E.2d 267, 271,446 N.Y.S.2d 906,
910 (1981) (Meyer, J., concurring).
200. State v. Elkins, 47 Ohio App. 2d 307, _ 354 N.E.2d 716, 718 (1976).
201. W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 2.2(f), at 283 (1978).
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B. A Discriminateand Nonintrusive Search
Alternatively or in conjunction with the plain smell doctrine, courts frequently justify their approval of sniff
searches by pointing to the discriminate and nonintrusive
nature of the procedure.2 °2 Unlike such indiscriminate surveillance tools as wiretaps and magnetometers, the sniff
search ideally reveals only the presence or absence of contraband. Thus, noncontraband items remain hidden and inviolable. Similarly, unlike intrusive methods of searching, as
when luggage is opened and sorted through, the sniff search
is exceedingly nonintrusive and convenient. In the context
of an airport baggage sniff search, most people are commonly left unaware that their possessions have ever been
examined. °3
However, it must be remembered that the essence of a
fourth amendment intrusion is that an area which one
rightly reserves as private is encroached upon.20 4 Although
the sniff search of an object "constitutes [not] a particularly
offensive intrusion," 205 still, such an examination detects hidden objects that the searchee regards as private. A magnetometer, though similarly nonintrusive, is not rendered any
less a search by virtue of its nonintrusiveness. 20 6 "The important factor is not the relative accuracy of the sensing device but the fact of an intrusion into a close[d] area otherwise
207
hidden from human view, the hallmark of any search."
The essence of surveillance technology is the accurate detection of secreted matter in a nonintrusive manner. Thus,
in Katz v. United States,0 8 the defendant's conversations
were overheard in the most nonintrusive way that science
202. See, e.g., United States v. Place, 103 S. Ct. 2637, 2644 (1983); United States
v. Goldstein, 635 F.2d 356, 361 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 962 (1981); People v.
Mayberry, 31 Cal. 3d 335, 342, 644 P.2d 810, 813, 182 Cal. Rptr. 617, 620 (1982).
203. See, e.g., United States v. Solis, 393 F. Supp. 325, 326 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (dogs
responded to contraband at distance of 25 feet; need not have touched the target at
all), rev'd, 536 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1976).
204. See United States v. Bronstein, 521 F.2d 459, 464 (2d Cir. 1976) (Mansfield,
J., concurring), cert. denied,424 U.S. 918 (1976).
205. Id
206. See supra note 11.
207. United States v. Bronstein, 521 F.2d 459, 464 (2d Cir. 1976) (Mansfield, J.,
concurring), cert. denied,424 U.S. 918 (1976).
208. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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allowed. Still, though, this invasion was disallowed because
it intruded upon the defendant's reasonable expectation of
privacy. Surely, then, "the determination of whether the
fourth amendment applies to a particular government activity depends very little on the type of activity itself. . . . The
primary focus is upon the interest to be protected rather than
the means of violating it."2 °9
It is commonly argued that the sniff search is somehow
legitimized because its nature is such that only those who
possess contraband are inconvenienced, while persons free
of contraband endure little or no inconvenience. Implicit in
this reasoning is the presumption that "guilty" people have
less right to inviolability from unlawful searches and
seizures than do "innocent" people. This is incorrect. The
Katz decision did not suggest that a person's reasonable expectation of privacy evaporates when contraband rather
than noncontraband is secreted. Indeed, the exclusionary
rule itself would seem to suggest an opposite conclusion, as
its purpose is to ensure that fourth amendment protections
"[reach] all alike, whether accused of crime or not . ...
The argument that sniff searches are permissible because
of their lack of intrusion and high degree of accuracy may be
reduced to the contention that the limited nature of the invasion justifies a minimal abrogation of fourth amendment
rights. The Katz Court rejected such a contention. The
Court there declared that a search will not be allowed "upon
the sole grounds that officers reasonably expected to find evidence of a particular crime and voluntarily confined their
activities to the least intrusive means consistent with that
end."' 211 The Katz decision was significant in that it refused
to sanction a fourth amendment violation merely because of
its lack of intrusion; the sniff search cases reject the Katz
standard by approving of a search precisely because of its
nonintrusiveness.
It has been proposed that a perfectly accurate and completely nonintrusive detector of contraband - a "divining
209.
617, 624
210.
211.

People v. Mayberry, 31 Cal. 3d 346, 348, 644 P.2d 810, 817, 182 Cal. Rptr.
(1982) (Bird, J., dissenting).
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914).
Katz, 389 U.S. at 356-57.
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rod" of crime - would pose no fourth amendment violation.212 Be that as it may, the very author of this proposition
allows that it does not mandate the carte blanche use of marijuana-sniffing dogs: "To the extent that the dog is less than
perfectly accurate, innocent people run the risk of being
searched. Additionally, the very act of being subjected to a
body sniff by a German Shepard may be offensive at best
• . . to the innocent sniffee. ' 21 3 Thus, given the fallibility of
the dogs' capabilities, all assurances of accuracy, discrimination, and nonintrusiveness are for naught.
The thirteen year-old plaintiff in Doe v. Renfrow, 2 14 innocent as she was, surely was quite unimpressed with the accuracy of the animal that examined her person; the dog having
erred, Doe then saw the assurance of nonintrusiveness vanish.215 The moment a dog so errs, the innocent searchee is
subjected to an examination of a highly indiscriminate and
intrusive nature. The trained canine is not a divining rod of
crime; it is merely an ignorant animal drilled in a simple
task.21 6 The intervention of odors more intriguing than contraband - such as that of a potential mate or a hated feline217 - render its strict training forgotten. The courts are
mistaken, then, in considering the detector dog an infallible
indicator of crime. In fact, the dogs are inclined to err, thus
rendering boasts as to their accuracy, discrimination, and
nonintrusiveness untrue.
C. On Reasonable Suspicion
A minority of courts have held that while a sniff search
does constitute a fourth amendment intrusion, the intrusion
is reasonable and allowable if undertaken with reasonable
212. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Devicefor Protecting the Innocent, 81
MICH. L. REV. 1229, 1246 (1983).
213. Id at 1246-47 (footnotes omitted).
214. 475 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ind. 1979), af'dinpart,631 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1022 (1981).
215. See supra notes 123-31 and accompanying text.
216. See Comment, supranote 10, at 414-18 (discussing the training that the dogs
are subjected to).
217. See Jones v. Latexo Indep. School Dist., 499 F. Supp. 223, 228 n.2 (E.D.
Tex. 1980) (dogs known to mistakenly respond to a variety of innocuous odors).
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suspicion. 2 18 The basis for this position is the belief that, be-

cause the sniff search is minimally intrusive, an officer's
"founded" or "articulable" suspicion provides adequate
fourth amendment protection. 219
The courts that adhere to this rationale - most notably
United States v. Beale220 - permit what is determined to be
a fourth amendment search to proceed with neither prior judicial approval nor a finding of probable cause. The practical result of this is not unlike the result that issues from those
courts which fail to recognize the sniff search as a fourth
amendment intrusion in the first instance.2 2 The same protection, or lack of protection, is provided for in either case:
persons are liberally subjected to sniff searches without a
showing of probable cause. It appears that the courts are
unanimous in reflecting a decided unwillingness to relinquish such an effective investigatory tool as the trained detector dog. 22
Clearly, then, the Beale court was not so revolutionary in
holding that the canine sniff constitutes a fourth amendment
intrusion; the practical effect is unchanged. Where prior
courts erred in failing to recognize the sniff search as a
fourth amendment intrusion in the first instance, thus never
reaching the issue of reasonableness, the Beale court erred in
failing to recognize the unreasonableness of the search.
V.

A PROPOSED ANALYSIS

The constitutionality of canine sniff searches must be examined according to the rule established in Katz v. United
States.223 Although most courts concede this much, few apply the Katz analysis properly, thus allowing the conclusion
218. See, e.g., United States v. Beale, 674 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1982), vacatedand
remanded, 103 S. Ct. 3529 (1983), af'd,736 F.2d 1289 (1984); People v. Furman, 30

Cal. App. 3d 454, 106 Cal. Rptr. 366 (1973); State v. Elkins, 47 Ohio App. 2d 307, 354
N.E.2d 716 (1976).
219. See United States v. Beale, 674 F.2d 1327, 1335 (9th Cir. 1982), vacatedand
remanded,103 S. Ct. 3529 (1983), aft'd, 736 F.2d 1289 (1984).
220. 674 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1982), vacatedand remanded 103 S. Ct. 3529 (1983),
af'd,736 F.2d 1289 (1984). See generally Note, Re-examining the Use of Drug-Detecting Dogs Without Probable Cause,71 GEO. L.J. 1233 (1982-83).
221. See supra notes 88-134 and accompanying text.
222. See W. LAFAvE, supranote 201, § 2.2(f), at 286-87 (1978).
223. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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that sniff searches are not violative of the fourth amendment.
A proper application of Katz renders the opposite
conclusion.
As established in the Katz decision and recounted in subsequent opinions,224 fourth amendment analysis entails a
two-pronged inquiry. First, it must be determined whether
the intrusion complained of constitutes a fourth amendment
search.25 The Katz decision has been interpreted as mandating that a governmental intrusion constitutes a fourth
amendment search if it violates the subject's reasonable expectation of privacy. An expectation of privacy is reasonable if it is one which society is prepared to recognize. 26
If it is determined that there did occur a fourth amendment intrusion, it must then be asked whether the intrusion
was reasonable; 227 the fourth amendment proscribes only unreasonablesearches and seizures. 28 The Katz Court explicitly tied the warrant clause to the reasonableness
requirement of the fourth amendment, thus establishing that
a search is '!per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment" 229 if it is not accompanied with prior judicial approval
"subject only to a few specifically established and welldelineated exceptions. 23 °
A.

Is the Dog Sniff a Search?

People expect that the things they carry about, concealed
from public view, will be treated as private. They do not
anticipate that their personal effects will be examined in
search of crime, unless the requirements of the fourth
amendment have been met. The canine sniff search performs such an investigatory function; the dog's nose effectively delves into one's pockets, or purse, or locker, 231 and
224. See supra note 34.
225. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 352-53.
226. See id.
at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
227. See id. at 354-57.

228. See supra note 2 for full text of the fourth amendment.
229. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357.
230. Id
231. See Jones v. Latexo Indep. School Dist., 499 F. Supp. 223, 233 (E.D. Tex.

1980) ("dog's inspection was virtual equivalent to a physical entry into the students'
pockets and personal possessions").
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"broadcasts its incriminating contents to the authorities. 232
Thus, the canine sniff is equivalent to the wiretap or magnetometer. Because the sniff search "discloses hidden items
within areas where there is a normal expectation of privacy," 233 it is a fourth amendment intrusion.
The only argument which would persuade an opposite
conclusion is that which contends that because of the sniff
search's accuracy, discrimination, and nonintrusiveness, it is
somehow less of a search. 234 This argument supposes a perfectly accurate, perfectly discriminate, and highly nonintrusive procedure.235 As has been shown, however, the trained
canine can boast of none of these qualities.236 Because the
dogs err, the inevitable follow-up investigations render the
procedure indiscriminate and intrusive. 237 Thus the innoand require fourth amendment
cent are 23threatened
8
protection.
B. Is the Search Reasonable?
The reasonableness of a search cannot be determined by
a consideration of its relative intrusiveness, as has been attempted by some courts.239 On the contrary, the Katz decision established that a fourth amendment search is
reasonable only if it is supported by a warrant, subject to a
few narrow exceptions. 2 ° A sniff search, then, is unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional if it is conducted without
a warrant, unless the search comes within one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. 24'
232. United States v. Beale, 674 F.2d 1327, 1334 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded, 103 S. Ct. 3529 (1983), aft'd, 736 F.2d 1289 (1984).
233. United States v. Bronstein, 521 F.2d 459, 464 (2d Cir. 1976) (Mansfield, J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 918 (1976).
234. See supra notes 213-17 and accompanying text.
235. See Loewy, supra note 212, at 1246.
236. See supra notes 213-17 and accompanying text.
237. See supra text accompanying notes 127-28.
238. See Loewy, supra note 212, at 1246.
239. See, e.g., United States v. Beale, 674 F.2d 1327, 1334 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated

andremanded,103 S. Ct. 3529 (1983), af'd,736 F.2d 1289 (1984); State v. Elkins, 47
Ohio App. 2d 307, 354 N.E.2d 716, 719 (1976).
240. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 357.
241. These exceptions to the fourth amendment warrant requirement are:
(1) plain view; (2) exigent circumstances; (3) automobile search; (4) search incident to
an arrest; (5) border search, (6) inventory search; (7) consent search; (8) investigative
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Of these exceptions, 242 it appears that three in particular
would frequently apply in sniff search incidents. Clearly, if
the subject consents, the search may constitutionally proceed. Likewise, a sniff search may be employed incident to a
valid arrest, as that exception allows the police officer to
search the arrestee and the area within the arrestee's immediate control. 243 Finally, under the exigent circumstances exception, police are permitted to conduct a search, upon a
finding of probable cause, in order to prevent the destruction
of evidence. A police officer may be justified by exigent circumstances in conducting a sniff search of a suspect's
luggage.244
It is evident, then, that this useful investigative tool
would not be rendered obsolete by a finding that it is subject
to fourth amendment strictures. Rather, its use would
merely be confined by constitutional limitations. 245
VI.

CONCLUSION

With Katz v. United States246 the United States Supreme
Court established that fourth amendment protections extend
to nontrespassory and nonintrusive invasions upon one's
personal inviolability. 247 The Katz Court declared that a
search cannot be sanctioned "upon the sole grounds that officers reasonably expected to find evidence of a particular
crime and voluntarily confined their activities to the least indetention search; and (9) search of regulated business. See Project, Twelfth Annual
Review of CriminalProcedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals
1981-82, 71 GEo. L.J. 339, 369-96 (1982-83).
242. See supra note 241.
243. In United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), the Supreme Court ruled
that the search of a container was not incident to the arrest if such container was in
the control of the police. Id at 15. However, the Court then went on to permit the
seizure of such containers, reasoning that the nature of a seizure was much less intrusive than the nature of a search. Id. It seems, then, that similar reasoning would
apply in the case of dog sniffing, that is, it would be permissible incident to an arrest,
as its nature is less intrusive than a conventional search. See Note, supranote 220, at
1249-50.
244. See Note, supra note 220, at 1249-50.
245. Cf Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358-59 (1967) (ruling that warrantless wiretapping is a fourth amendment intrusion). Clearly, the Katz decision has not
resulted in the obsolescence of wiretapping.
246. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
247. See supra notes 24-41 and accompanying text.
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trusive means . . "248 Unfortunately, the rule of Katz has
largely been ignored by subsequent courts that have considered the constitutionality of canine sniff searches.
These courts are persuaded that the relative inoffensiveness of the sniff search renders it acceptable. In support of
this conclusion, the courts propose, alternatively or conjunctionally, a plain smell analysis and an argument establishing
the discrimination and nonintrusiveness of the sniff search
procedure. However, both of these propositions are mistaken. The correct result is that the canine sniff search does
constitute a fourth amendment intrusion and must therefore
proceed according to the strictures of that amendment. An
opposite conclusion would too often subject the innocent to
unreasonable searches and seizures, a prospect which the
249
fourth amendment was intended to prevent.
WILLIAM M. FITZGERALD

248. Katz, 389 U.S. at 356-57.
249. See Loewy, supra note 212, at 1246-47.

